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This study examines the role of di↵erences in firms’ propensity to meet earnings ex-
pectations in explaining why firms with high analyst forecast dispersion experience rela-
tively low future stock returns. We first demonstrate that the negative relation between
dispersion and returns is concentrated around earnings announcements. Next, we show
that this relation disappears when we control for ex-ante measures of firms’ propen-
sity to meet earnings expectations and that the component of dispersion explained by
these measures drives the return predictability of dispersion. We further demonstrate
that firms with low analyst dispersion are substantially more likely to achieve posi-
tive earnings surprises, and provide new evidence consistent with both expectations
management and strategic forecast pessimism explaining this result. Overall, we con-
clude that investor mispricing of firms’ participation in the earnings expectations game
provides a viable explanation for the dispersion anomaly.
Keywords: Earnings announcements, sell-side analysts, forecast bias, expectations
management, mispricing, forecast dispersion, earnings surprises.
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1. Introduction
Firms with high dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts are associated with significantly
lower future stock returns than firms with low dispersion (Diether et al. [2002]). The negative
relation between analyst dispersion and returns is puzzling because high-dispersion firms are
arguably risky, but they experience relatively low returns.
Interpreting forecast dispersion as a proxy for di↵erences of opinion, Diether et al. [2002]
conclude that their result is consistent with Miller [1977]. Specifically, Miller [1977] conjec-
tures that when investors have di↵erences of opinion about the value of a firm, short-sale
constraints keep the relatively pessimistic investors from trading the stock. The overpricing
induced by this e↵ect increases in di↵erences of opinion and leads to lower stock returns
when the overpricing is subsequently corrected.1 However, several studies debate whether
mispricing explains the dispersion anomaly. Most notably, Johnson [2004] provides a risk-
based explanation and argues that dispersion captures idiosyncratic information risk that
increases the option value of the firm. He predicts and finds that for a levered firm, higher
levels of idiosyncratic asset risk reduce expected returns.2
In this paper, we propose that firms’ incentives to meet analysts’ quarterly earnings
expectations provide an alternative explanation for the dispersion anomaly. These incentives
arise from the costs that firm managers bear when reporting earnings that miss consensus
analyst expectations (e.g., Graham et al. [2005]). To increase the likelihood that earnings
meet expectations, firms can manage the information set available to analysts and steer their
expectations downwards to beatable levels (Bartov et al. [2002]; Matsumoto [2002]; Hutton
[2005]; Cotter et al. [2006]). Analysts, in turn, have incentives to follow these cues from
1The results from Avramov et al. [2009] are also consistent with mispricing, as they find that forecast
dispersion is correlated with financial distress and that the return predictability of dispersion is driven by
the low future returns associated with weak credit ratings. Sadka and Scherbina [2007] further find that
high dispersion coincides with high trading costs and that less liquid stocks are more overpriced.
2See also Barinov [2013]. Doukas et al. [2006] and Barron et al. [2009] separate dispersion into components
related to di↵erences of opinion and uncertainty. They find that di↵erences of opinion are positively related
to future returns, while the uncertainty component of dispersion is negatively related to future returns, which
they interpret as being consistent with Johnson [2004].
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management (Feng and McVay [2010]; Ciconte et al. [2014]) or to “lowball” their forecasts
to increase access to management (Ke and Yu [2006]; Hilary and Hsu [2013]). This strategic
behavior of both analysts and managers, which we label the earnings expectations game,
induces a predictable pessimistic bias in analysts’ forecasts and causes the majority of firms
to meet or beat these biased expectations each quarter.
Our proposed mechanism for the dispersion anomaly rests on two pillars. First, we argue
that the earnings expectations game induces a negative relation between analyst dispersion
and firms’ propensity to meet earnings expectations. As explained in Section 2, expectations
management in the form of earnings guidance is expected to reduce dispersion in analysts’
forecasts (e.g., Bowen et al. [2002]; Clement et al. [2003]; Irani and Karamanou [2003]).
Moreover, the repeated nature of the earnings expectations game decreases dispersion be-
cause it increases the precision of analysts’ information (e.g., Barron et al. [1998]; Ke and
Yu [2006]) and it reduces the magnitude and volatility of firms’ earnings surprises over time.
Therefore, we argue that portfolio sorts of firms by analyst dispersion, as in Diether et al.
[2002], also produce sorts on the ex-ante likelihood that firms report earnings that meet
analyst expectations.
The second pillar relates to the pricing implications of the earnings expectations game.
For the relation between dispersion and firms’ earnings surprises to explain the dispersion
anomaly, investors should not fully unravel the relation between dispersion and firms’ propen-
sity to meet analyst expectations. Recent work by Veenman and Verwijmeren [2018] and
Johnson et al. [2020] provides evidence that supports this notion. These studies find that
ex-ante measures of analyst forecast pessimism and firms’ expectations management incen-
tives, respectively, are strongly related to subsequent earnings announcement returns. Their
results are consistent with the earnings expectations game inducing predictable errors in
investors’ earnings expectations.
For a large sample covering the period 1993 to 2019 and using dispersion variables based
on annual and quarterly earnings forecasts, we first replicate the result that high-dispersion
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firms have significantly lower future stock returns than low-dispersion firms. We demonstrate
that this e↵ect is concentrated in (expected) earnings announcement months and around the
earnings announcement date. In fact, we find that the negative relation between dispersion
and returns is no longer visible when we exclude the earnings announcement window from
the monthly returns. In a multiple regression framework explaining the returns in expected
earnings announcement months, the return di↵erences based on forecast dispersion are robust
to controlling for other predictive firm characteristics and are not explained by short-sale
constraints in our sample.
Next, we show that the relation between dispersion and returns weakens materially when
we control for the expectations management incentives (EMI) and forecast pessimism (PESS)
measures from Johnson et al. [2020] and Veenman and Verwijmeren [2018]. For instance, the
average return spreads between firms with low and high annual forecast dispersion drop from
61 to 27 basis points after including these variables in the regression. To further understand
this result, we use a two-stage approach in which the first stage consists of decomposing
dispersion into components that are explained versus unexplained by the EMI and PESS
measures. The first-stage results indicate that dispersion is strongly negatively related to
the EMI and PESS measures. In the second stage, we regress returns on these orthogonal
components and find that the fitted values of dispersion drive the negative relation between
dispersion and returns. For the residual component of dispersion, we do not find a significant
relation with returns. These results are consistent with the earnings expectations game
playing an important role in explaining the dispersion anomaly.
When we combine these results into a trading strategy, we uncover statistically and eco-
nomically highly significant di↵erences in portfolio returns in expected earnings announce-
ment months. Specifically, a portfolio of firms in the lowest quintile of fitted analyst dis-
persion (i.e., dispersion explained by the EMI and PESS measures) produces monthly risk-
adjusted returns that are 94-108 basis points higher than a portfolio of firms in the highest
quintile of fitted dispersion. These di↵erences in risk-adjusted portfolio returns are measured
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after controlling for both standard risk-factor exposures and an earnings announcement risk
factor (Chang et al. [2017]; Johnson et al. [2020]).
We also provide more evidence on the mechanism explaining the link between dispersion
and firms’ propensity to meet expectations. Conditional on other variables, firms in the
lowest decile of dispersion are approximately 22 percentage points more likely to meet ex-
pectations than firms in the highest decile. Consistent with the earnings expectations game
providing an explanation for this link, we find that earnings guidance significantly reduces
dispersion within the firm-quarter (while increasing the probability of meeting expectations).
We further find that firms more likely engaged in the earnings expectations game display
less volatile earnings surprises, which suggests that low dispersion is consistent with earnings
being more predictable for these firms. Moreover, these firms’ analysts issue forecasts closer
to the prevailing consensus, are more likely to lowball forecasts by one or two cents, and are
more likely to issue forecasts that reduce dispersion.
In additional tests focused on the short-window returns around earnings announcements,
we find that the negative relation between dispersion and announcement returns is incre-
mental to the negative relation of announcement returns with common proxies for di↵erences
of opinion (Berkman et al. [2009]). Moreover, the negative relation between dispersion and
announcement returns disappears when we control for the ex-post earnings surprise. This
result further supports our conclusion that investors’ mispricing of predictable variation in
earnings surprises helps explain the negative relation between dispersion and returns.
Overall, this study contributes to the literature following Diether et al. [2002] that at-
tempts to explain the relation between analyst dispersion and stock returns. We conclude
that investors’ mispricing of the predictable pessimistic bias in analysts’ forecasts, caused by
firms’ incentives to meet earnings expectations, provides a viable explanation for the disper-
sion anomaly. We also contribute to the literature focused on the pricing implications of the
earnings expectations game (e.g., Bartov et al. [2002]; Kasznik and McNichols [2002]; Keung
et al. [2010]; Abarbanell and Park [2017]; Ma and Markov [2017]; Veenman and Verwijmeren
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[2018]; Johnson et al. [2020]). We demonstrate how and why analyst forecast dispersion can
be used to sort firms on the (ex-ante) likelihood that they report earnings that meet analyst
expectations, which maps into predictable variation in earnings announcement returns.
Our study complements Berkman et al. [2009], who examine the implications of Miller
[1977] for earnings announcement returns. Using five measures of di↵erences of opinion,
including analyst dispersion, Berkman et al. [2009] find that firms with high di↵erences of
opinion are associated with significantly lower announcement returns than firms with low
di↵erences of opinion. They conclude that these lower returns are consistent with earnings
announcements correcting the pre-announcement price increases that are induced by the
combination of di↵erences of opinion and short-sale constraints. Our study helps explain
why the results on analyst dispersion in Berkman et al. [2009] are less consistent with Miller
[1977] than the results based on their other variables of di↵erences of opinion.3
Besides the role of short-sale constraints, Diether et al. [2002] suggest that analysts’
incentives for forecast optimism could also explain the dispersion anomaly. They conjecture
that analysts’ self-selection in their coverage of firms (e.g., McNichols and O’Brien [1997])
can induce an optimistic bias in market earnings expectations that subsequently corrects and
leads to negative return patterns.4 A major downside of this suggested explanation based on
forecast optimism, however, is that it is di cult to reconcile with the systematic tendency
for analysts’ forecasts to be pessimistic instead of optimistic at the time of the earnings
announcement (e.g., Richardson et al. [2004]; Ke and Yu [2006]; Chan et al. [2007]; Zweig
[2018]). We find that investor mispricing of firms’ propensity to meet analysts’ pessimistic
earnings expectations provides a more viable explanation for the dispersion anomaly.
3Specifically, Berkman et al. [2009] do not find that dispersion is significantly more negatively related to
announcement returns in the presence of greater short-sale constraints (their Table 3, Panel B). In addition,
they find no evidence of significant overvaluation before earnings announcements for firms with high disper-
sion and short-sale constraints (their Table 7). In our Online Appendix, we corroborate their results that
short-sale constraints do not moderate the negative relation between dispersion and announcement returns
during our sample period, and that dispersion is not associated with pre-announcement price increases.
4Hwang and Li [2017] similarly argue that the relation between dispersion and future returns, which
they find extends to a large international sample of firms, is consistent with analysts’ incentives for forecast
optimism and the self-selection in coverage.
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2. On the link between analyst dispersion and the earnings expectations game
We propose that firms’ incentives to meet or beat analyst earnings expectations, and
analysts’ incentives to help firms achieve that objective, provide an explanation for the
dispersion anomaly. We argue that the strategic behavior of firms and analysts in the
earnings expectations game induces both higher returns around earnings announcements
and lower forecast dispersion.
The link between the earnings expectations game and stock returns follows from recent
studies that find investors fail to fully unravel the pessimistic bias in analyst earnings ex-
pectations that is induced by firms’ and analysts’ strategic behavior (e.g., Veenman and
Verwijmeren [2018]; Johnson et al. [2020]). For example, Johnson et al. [2020] find that a
proxy for firms’ expectations management incentives is positively related to analyst-based
earnings surprises and the returns in expected earnings announcement months, while it is
negatively related to returns in the previous month when expectations are managed down-
ward. Similarly, Veenman and Verwijmeren [2018] show that measures of analysts’ past
forecast pessimism are positively related to earnings surprises and announcement returns.
The results from these studies are consistent with investors mispricing the predictable bias
in firms’ earnings surprises.
Prior research has also documented significant negative relations between forecast dis-
persion and firms’ propensity to meet analyst expectations. However, these relations are
typically incidental to the main research question and therefore not well understood.5 In the
next two subsections, we propose two related explanations for this negative relation. Figure
1 presents causal diagrams to illustrate our argumentation based on directed acyclic graphs
(Pearl [1995]; Morgan and Winship [2015]; Gow et al. [2016]).
5Specifically, prior research has found significantly negative coe cients on analyst dispersion when used
as a control variable in regressions explaining firms’ likelihood of meeting analyst expectations. See, for
example, Barton and Simko [2002, Table 5], Heflin and Hsu [2008, Table 5], or Jiang et al. [2010, Table 3]).
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2.1. Within-quarter e↵ect of expectations management on forecast dispersion
Firms can provide earnings guidance to manage analyst expectations. Cotter et al. [2006]
find that public earnings guidance lowers the consensus forecast and increases firms’ ability to
meet analyst expectations, which is consistent with analysts’ willingness to be misguided by
managers (Feng and McVay [2010]; Ciconte et al. [2014]). The consequence of such guidance
is that it increases the precision of common information available to analysts, which lowers
analyst dispersion (Barron et al. [1998]). Clement et al. [2003] and Bowen et al. [2002]
empirically confirm that increases in the precision of analysts’ common information through
earnings guidance and conference calls, respectively, reduce forecast dispersion. Houston
et al. [2010] and Chen et al. [2011] further find that forecast dispersion increases when firms
stop providing public earnings guidance. Hence, public guidance induces both lower analyst
dispersion and a greater likelihood that firms report earnings that meet analyst expectations.6
Panel A of Figure 1 visualizes these conceptual links.
2.2. Across-quarter e↵ect of the expectations game on forecast dispersion
The previous discussion revolved around the e↵ects of expectations management on an-
alyst dispersion within a firm-quarter. However, the earnings expectations game repeats
across quarters and this leads to persistent biases in earnings surprises and analysts’ fore-
casts over time (e.g., Matsumoto [2002]; Veenman and Verwijmeren [2018]). To the extent
that analysts strategically issue pessimistic forecasts in one period to increase their access
to management in the next period (Ke and Yu [2006]; Hilary and Hsu [2013]), this access to
management should increase the precision of the average analyst’s information and therefore
6A decrease in dispersion can also follow from private earnings guidance. Irani and Karamanou [2003]
and Mohanram and Sunder [2006] find that dispersion increased after Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD)
banned firms’ explicit use of private earnings guidance to individual analysts. Similarly, Wang [2007] finds
that firms that did not replace their private guidance with public guidance after Reg FD experience significant
increases in analyst dispersion. Combined with the positive e↵ect of private guidance on firms’ ability to
meet earnings forecasts (Hutton [2005]; Matsumoto [2002]), this suggests that private guidance also induces
a negative relation between dispersion and firms’ propensity to meet analyst expectations. Although the
observed empirical relations in our paper can partly reflect the e↵ect of private guidance, we do not attempt
to empirically isolate this e↵ect.
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decrease dispersion (Barron et al. [1998]). Accordingly, we argue that analysts’ strategic
forecast pessimism further strengthens the negative relation between forecast dispersion and
firms’ propensity to meet or beat expectations over time.
Another issue is that managers have incentives to both meet analyst expectations and
to limit the magnitude and volatility of earnings surprises (Graham et al. [2005]; Cheong
and Thomas [2018]). In this regard, Durtschi and Easton [2005] conclude that analysts’
pessimistic forecast errors are much smaller in magnitude than their optimistic forecast er-
rors. Smaller earnings surprises in prior quarters make firms’ earnings more predictable
relative to the prevailing consensus forecast in the current quarter and, given analysts’ in-
centives to issue forecasts close to the consensus (e.g., Trueman [1994]; Hong et al. [2000]),
this increased predictability and herding should reduce current-quarter dispersion (Liu and
Natarajan [2012]). Hence, we argue that firms that consistently meet analysts’ pessimistic
expectations should also display relatively low analyst dispersion over time. Panel B of
Figure 1 visualizes these conceptual links.
3. Research design
3.1. Variable measurement
Following Diether et al. [2002], we measure forecast dispersion using the standard devi-
ation of analysts’ annual earnings forecasts obtained from the IBES Unadjusted Summary
History files, scaled by the absolute value of the mean consensus forecast (i.e., the coe -
cient of variation). When the mean consensus forecast is zero, we set the dispersion variable
(DispAt) equal to the maximum sample value such that these observations end up in the
highest dispersion portfolio. We measure dispersion in the month before we measure stock
returns and earnings announcement news. Similar to Berkman et al. [2009], we also construct
DispQt based on the standard deviation of analysts’ quarterly earnings forecasts.
We compute a firm’s quarterly earnings surprise (Surpriset) as the di↵erence between
actual earnings, obtained from the IBES Unadjusted files, and the mean consensus forecast
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based on individual analysts’ latest forecasts from the IBES Unadjusted detail files. To
construct this consensus forecast, we eliminate forecasts older than 180 days and adjust
forecasts for stock splits occurring between the forecast date and the earnings announcement
date using the CRSP cumulative factor to adjust prices.7 Based on Surpriset, we construct
an indicator variable Meett that is set equal to 1 if the earnings surprise is non-negative,
and 0 if it is negative.
For our monthly return tests, we follow Johnson et al. [2020] in estimating firms’ expected
earnings announcement months using the date of the same-quarter earnings announcement
one year earlier. This procedure relies on information that is available at the time of portfolio
formation and ensures that the results are not influenced by the (ex-post) timing of earnings
announcements (e.g., Cohen et al. [2007]).
For our tests explaining short-window announcement returns, we identify firms’ actual
earnings announcement dates by picking the earliest of the Compustat and IBES announce-
ment dates (Dellavigna and Pollet [2009]) and by eliminating observations for which Compus-
tat and IBES disagree about the announcement date by more than two trading days. We also
adjust announcements identified as occurring after market close to the subsequent trading
day using the IBES timestamps (Johnson and So [2018]). Given these procedures, we mea-
sure the market reaction to earnings announcements starting on the day of announcement.
Variable BHAR[0,2]t equals the buy-and-hold size-adjusted returns measured from the date of
the earnings announcement through two days after the earnings announcement, where size-
adjusted returns are computed relative to the CRSP value-weighted market capitalization
index based on NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ cuto↵s.
To test the role of firms’ participation in the earnings expectations game in explaining
the dispersion anomaly, we rely on ex-ante variables of firms’ propensity to meet or beat
7Following Diether et al. [2002], we rely on the IBES data that is unadjusted for stock splits in order to
properly identify cases where firms meet versus miss consensus analyst expectations. Relying on IBES data
adjusted for splits, which are rounded to the nearest cent, would lead to a non-trivial number of observations
being transformed to (rounded) 0¢ earnings surprises, while instead the firm beat or missed the consensus
forecast. We adjust the unadjusted forecasts for stock splits using the CRSP split factor (CFACPR) in order
to better align the (unrounded) forecasts and actuals.
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earnings expectations from recent studies. First, Johnson et al. [2020] create a composite
measure of firms’ expectations management incentives (EMI) and find that this measure is
positively related to earnings surprises, positively related to returns in expected earnings
announcement months, and negatively related to returns in the prior month when expecta-
tions are managed downward. Following their work, we construct a parsimonious measure
of expectations management incentives based on a monthly principal component analysis of
variables capturing incentives to manage expectations (EMIt 1).
We start by measuring EMI using proxies for the “attention” to earnings news: analyst
coverage and institutional investor ownership. Johnson et al. [2020] show that these variables
explain the bulk of the variation in their EMI measure and primarily drive the return patterns
they uncover. Next, to proxy for the “pressure” to meet expectations and the “relevance” of
earnings news for stock prices, we use a simple variable that captures the fraction of losses
reported in the most recent 12 quarters. Prior work suggests profitable firms face greater
incentives to report positive earnings surprises (Brown [2001]; Matsumoto [2002]), while the
stock prices of profitable firms are more sensitive to earnings news than those of loss-making
firms due to shareholders’ abandonment option (Hayn [1995]).8
Second, Veenman and Verwijmeren [2018] find that measures of analysts’ prior forecast
pessimism (PESS) can be used to assess the extent of pessimism in the current-quarter con-
sensus forecast, and similarly find that these measures predict both firms’ propensity to meet
earnings expectations and the returns around earnings announcements. We replicate their
two ex-ante measures of analyst forecast pessimism: PESSC
t 1 is based on pessimism versus
optimism in the firm’s previous consensus forecasts, and PESSI
t 1 is based on pessimism
versus optimism in the individual analysts’ previous forecasts. See Appendix A for more
8Following Johnson et al. [2020], we transform the input variables to monthly percentile ranks scaled
between 0 and 1 before we estimate EMIt 1 as the first principal component in each sample month. Con-
sistent with the prediction that analyst coverage and institutional ownership are positively related to EMI,
while loss frequency is negatively related to EMI, the first two variables load positively (average weights of
0.669 and 0.662, respectively) and the third component loads negatively (average weight of -0.317) in the
principal component analysis. The inferences in our paper are similar when we use the EMI measure from
https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhz141, which is available only for a subset of our data and sample period.
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details on the construction of the EMI and PESS variables.
We use both the EMI and PESS variables because we consider them as complementary
indicators of firms’ participation in the earnings expectations game. While the EMI measure
captures firms’ incentives to manage expectations to beatable levels (e.g., through down-
ward earnings guidance), the PESS measures additionally capture analysts’ desire to curry
favor with firm management by lowballing their forecasts. Consistent with each variable
capturing di↵erent dimensions of the earnings expectations game, the time-series average
of monthly correlations of EMIt 1 with PESSCt 1 and PESS
I
t 1 equal 0.274 and 0.210, re-
spectively. The average correlation between PESSC
t 1 and PESS
I
t 1 equals 0.396. As we
demonstrate later, each variable has incremental predictive power for the returns around
earnings announcements.
3.2. Data
Table 1 presents the sample selection procedures. For our monthly return tests, we obtain
security-month observations from CRSP for firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ. To
mirror our examination of announcement news for firm-quarters ending in calendar quarters
1993Q1 through 2018Q4 (see below), our sample comprises the 312 months from April 1993
through March 2019. We include delisting returns from CRSP and adjust for missing delist-
ing returns following Shumway and Warther [1999]. We retain only those observations with
a stock price of at least $1 at the end of the previous month and attach the previous-month
forecast dispersion from IBES. These procedures lead to a sample of 971,213 monthly return
observations, of which 295,606 are expected earnings announcement months. After requiring
additional data on size, book-to-market, prior returns, and the EMI and PESS measures,
the expected earnings announcement-month sample comprises 277,690 observations.
For our quarterly announcement sample, we obtain firm-quarters from the intersection
of CRSP and Compustat that end in the calendar quarters 1993Q1 through 2018Q4. We
drop firms not listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ, firms with quarter-end stock price
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below $1, and firms missing earnings announcement dates in Compustat (RDQ). We next
drop observations missing earnings surprise data in IBES and observations missing earnings
announcement return data in CRSP. After eliminating all firm-quarters without dispersion
variables available and missing data for the control variables, we have a sample of 290,774
firm-quarter observations over the period 1993Q1 to 2018Q4.9 In the Online Appendix, we
present insights on the sample composition over time and show that firms in our sample
meet earnings expectations in roughly two-thirds of cases.
4. Analyst dispersion, stock returns, and earnings announcements
4.1. Replicating the dispersion anomaly
In Table 2, we first present a re-examination of the general relation between forecast
dispersion and returns in our sample. We do this using the dispersion of annual earnings
forecasts in Panel A, and based on quarterly forecasts in Panel B. We perform this re-
examination because recent studies demonstrate that many variables have lost their return-
predictive power due to more liquid markets and general knowledge of these signals following
initial publication (e.g., Green et al. [2011]; Chordia et al. [2014]; McLean and Ponti↵ [2016]).
Table 2 presents the time-series averages of returns for monthly quintile portfolios formed
based on dispersion.10 Consistent with Diether et al. [2002], we find that low-dispersion firms
experience higher returns than high-dispersion firms. For example, based on the dispersion
in annual earnings forecasts in Panel A, firms in Q1 earn significant average returns of 0.91
percent, while firms in Q5 earn insignificant average returns of 0.48 percent. Although the
average return di↵erence between the low- and high-dispersion portfolios of 0.43 percent is
statistically insignificant in Panel A (p-value: 0.130), it is significant in Panel B based on
the dispersion in quarterly forecasts (p-value: 0.036).11
9Note that this quarterly announcement sample is larger than the monthly return dataset because we
do not require data on the EMI and PESS measures for this sample.
10Throughout the paper, standard errors of the average estimates are adjusted for autocorrelation using
the Newey and West [1987] adjustment with five lags.
11Consistent with Diether et al. [2002], we also find that these return di↵erences are greatest for smaller
firms. When we split the sample into larger and smaller firms based on the monthly median lagged market
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When we perform calendar-time portfolio regressions based on the Fama-French four-
factor model, we find that the monthly risk-adjusted return di↵erences (alphas) increase
to 0.55 and 0.52 in Panels A and B, respectively, and become statistically more significant
(t-values of 3.34 and 3.98, respectively). Although smaller than the 0.79 percent originally
reported by Diether et al. [2002], these results suggest that the dispersion anomaly exists even
during our more recent sample period. In addition, it is worth mentioning that while high-
dispersion firms earn significantly negative abnormal returns (the short side), low-dispersion
firms actually earn significantly positive abnormal returns (the long side).
We next split the sample into earnings announcement and non-earnings announcement
months. Because we argue that the link between dispersion and firms’ propensity to meet
earnings expectations plays a role in explaining the dispersion anomaly, we expect return
di↵erences to be concentrated around earnings announcements. Doing so, we find significant
return di↵erences for both dispersion variables only in expected earnings announcement
months. Based on the dispersion in annual (quarterly) forecasts in Panel A (Panel B) of
Table 2, we find statistically significant return di↵erences equal to 0.65 percent (0.60 percent).
Return di↵erences are small and insignificant in the other months, and the rightmost column
in Panels A and B reveal that the di↵erences in return spreads between earnings and non-
earnings announcement months are statistically significant. These return di↵erences become
even stronger when we focus on actual earnings announcement months.
Similar to Berkman et al. [2009], we also find that forecast dispersion is significantly
related to short-window announcement returns. In Panel A (Panel B) of Table 2, firms
with low annual (quarterly) forecast dispersion have announcement returns that are 0.61
percent (0.53 percent) higher compared to firms with high forecast dispersion. Importantly,
a comparison of the full announcement-month returns with the short-window returns suggests
that the bulk of the return di↵erence is concentrated around the earnings announcement. To
capitalization, we find (untabulated) significant return di↵erences for the smaller sample firms of 0.66 (t-
value of 2.89) and 0.65 (t-value of 3.77) percentage points based on annual and quarterly forecast dispersion,
respectively. Return di↵erences are small and insignificant for the larger sample firms. Note, however, that
these “smaller” firms are still relatively large as they are required to be covered by at least two analysts.
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further evaluate this observation, we examine di↵erences in average portfolio returns after
we adjust the announcement-month returns for the short-window announcement returns.
Doing so, the announcement-month return di↵erences reduce to -0.014 and 0.004 percent in
Panels A and B, respectively.
Overall, the descriptive results in Table 2 provide evidence consistent with the dispersion
anomaly. In addition, they suggest that the return predictability of forecast dispersion is a
phenomenon that concentrates primarily around earnings announcements.
4.2. Cross-sectional regressions
In this section, we examine the relation between expected announcement-month returns
and dispersion after controlling for other return-predictive variables. We first control for
standard measures of firm size (Sizet), book-to-market (BtMt), and prior returns (Rett 1
and Rett 2,t 12). Next, we additionally control for leverage (Levt), firm age (Aget), analyst
coverage (Analystst), and institutional ownership (Instt), and include three variables for
di↵erences of opinion examined by Berkman et al. [2009]: the standard deviation of daily
returns measured over the period from 55 through 11 days before the expected announcement
month (Retvolt); the volatility of earnings in the previous 20 quarters (Evolt); and turnover,
measured as the average daily ratio of trading volume to shares outstanding in the window
from 55 through 11 days before the expected announcement month (Turnt). We include
these last three variables to assess the extent to which the relation between dispersion and
announcement returns is unique and incremental to measures of di↵erences of opinion.
Panel A of Table 3 presents results from monthly cross-sectional regressions (Fama and
MacBeth [1973]). We transform all independent variables to decile ranks scaled between -0.5
and 0.5, such that each coe cient captures the di↵erence in average announcement returns
between firms in the highest and lowest deciles (e.g., Livnat and Mendenhall [2006]). The
results reveal significant di↵erences in returns between high- and low-dispersion firms. Based
on annual (quarterly) forecast dispersion and the standard controls for size, book-to-market,
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and prior returns, low-dispersion firms have monthly returns that are 61 (62) basis points
higher than high-dispersion firms. These return spreads remain remarkably stable, and
strengthen in statistical significance, after we add the other set of control variables including
the di↵erences-of-opinion variables from Berkman et al. [2009].12
Next, we examine the e↵ects of including the EMI and PESS measures in the regressions.
If the negative relation between dispersion and returns in expected announcement months
is driven by firms’ participation in the earnings expectations game, we should observe the
negative relation to be attenuated after proxies for this participation are included in the re-
gressions. This is exactly what we find. After including EMIt 1, PESSCt 1, and PESS
I
t 1,
the coe cients on the dispersion variables drop by more than half and are no longer statis-
tically significant at p < 0.05. Moreover, the EMI and PESS variables are each associated
with significant incremental return spreads. These results provide initial support for our
prediction that investor mispricing of variation in firms’ propensity to meet or beat earnings
expectations provides an explanation for the dispersion anomaly.
4.3. Alternative explanation based on short-sale constraints
Nagel [2005] finds some evidence that the negative relation between dispersion and fu-
ture returns is concentrated among firms with more binding short-sale constraints, which
is consistent with the proposed explanation for the dispersion anomaly by Diether et al.
[2002] based on Miller [1977]. Berkman et al. [2009] perform a similar test using earnings
announcement returns, but find no significant di↵erence in dispersion return spreads between
firms with high and low short-sale constraints (their Table 3). In the Online Appendix, we
use institutional ownership as an inverse proxy for short-sale constraints. Consistent with
both Berkman et al. [2009] and a reduced relevance of short-sale constraints in recent sample
12The risk-based explanation proposed by Johnson [2004] suggests that the negative relation between dis-
persion and returns should be increasing in firms’ leverage. Inconsistent with this prediction, in untabulated
tests we find no evidence of a more negative relation between dispersion and announcement returns when we
interact the dispersion variable with leverage in our cross-sectional regressions. Berkman et al. [2009] and
Avramov et al. [2009] similarly find no significant interaction e↵ect based on leverage.
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periods, we find no evidence that suggests short-sale constraints explain the relation between
analyst dispersion and earnings announcement returns in our sample.
4.4. Explaining dispersion with EMI and PESS measures
Panel A of Table 4 shows that, consistent with Johnson et al. [2020] and Veenman
and Verwijmeren [2018], EMIt 1, PESSCt 1, and PESS
I
t 1 are strongly related to firms’
propensity to meet expectations and the returns in expected announcement months. For
example, firms in the highest quintile of EMIt 1 are on average 14.3 percentage points more
likely to report a non-negative earnings surprise, whereas monthly return spreads range from
80 basis points for PESSC
t 1 to 89 basis points for EMIt 1. We also find strong negative
associations of the measures with the dispersion variables. For example, the time-series
average of the monthly median value of annual forecast dispersion of firms in the highest
(lowest) PESSC
t 1 quintile equals 0.021 (0.084). These results confirm that the EMI and
PESS measures are relevant in understanding the relation between dispersion and returns.
In Panel B of Table 4, we estimate monthly cross-sectional regressions of forecast dis-
persion on the EMI and PESS measures. The regression results confirm the strong negative
relations found in Panel A and indicate that each measure has a significant incremental re-
lation with dispersion. These results suggest that firms that are more likely to be involved
in the earnings expectations game, as indicated by higher expectations management incen-
tives and pessimistic analyst forecasts, are also associated with significantly lower forecast
dispersion. We next use the regressions that include EMIt 1, PESSCt 1, and PESS
I
t 1 to
construct fitted and residual values of forecast dispersion. We employ these fitted and resid-
ual values of forecast dispersion to predict returns and to isolate the e↵ect of the dispersion
component that relates to the earnings expectations game.
The results in Panel C of Table 4 show that the negative relation between dispersion and
returns is driven by the fitted values of dispersion. The portion of forecast dispersion that
is explained by the three variables has strong predictive power for announcement returns,
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with monthly return spreads of 112–122 basis points. In contrast, the residual values are not
significantly associated with returns. When the fitted and residual dispersion variables are
combined in one regression, we find that the announcement return spreads based on fitted
dispersion are significantly di↵erent from the spreads based on residual dispersion.
Although the first-stage regression results in Panel B of Table 4 suggest that the EMI and
PESS measures explain only a small part of the variation in dispersion (the average explana-
tory power equals 14.7 (9.4) percent for annual (quarterly) dispersion), the results in Panel
C reveal that this small component of dispersion explains all of the expected announcement-
month return spreads associated with dispersion. Combined with the observation that the
return spreads concentrate around earnings announcements, these results are consistent with
the prediction that the dispersion anomaly can be explained by the relation between disper-
sion and firms’ participation in the earnings expectations game.
4.5. Portfolio tests of fitted and residual dispersion measures
To provide more economic context to the results presented in the previous section, we
conduct Fama-French regressions of portfolio returns on risk factors. For each expected
earnings announcement month, we construct quintile portfolios based on the lagged values
of fitted and residual dispersion and compute average (equal-weighted) portfolio returns by
quintile for each of the 312 months in our sample.
We estimate calendar-time portfolio regressions using a Fama-French four-factor model
that we augment with an earnings announcement risk factor (EARF ) similar to Chang et al.
[2017] and Johnson et al. [2020]. We include this additional factor because an alternative
explanation for the di↵erences in returns for firms with high and low dispersion could be that
firms have di↵erent exposures to earnings announcement premia. Prior studies such as Ball
and Kothari [1991] and Cohen et al. [2007] find that firms earn significantly higher returns
around their earnings announcement dates. EARF is defined as the monthly di↵erence in
value-weighted returns between firms that are expected to announce earnings and those that
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are not expected to announce earnings.
The results in Table 5 suggest that portfolios based on the fitted values of dispersion
produce statistically and economically significant risk-adjusted returns in expected earnings
announcement months. Based on fitted annual (quarterly) forecast dispersion in Panel A
(Panel B), monthly risk-adjusted return spreads equal 94 (108) basis points.13 Moreover, a
large part of the return spreads is realized on the long side of the portfolio, as the Q1 (low
fitted dispersion) portfolio has an alpha of 57 (65) basis points. In contrast, the return spreads
are insignificant at 16 (25) basis points for portfolios formed based on residual dispersion,
and the di↵erences in return spreads between the portfolios formed on fitted versus residual
dispersion are highly significant.
These results suggest that isolating the variation in analyst dispersion that relates to
firms’ propensity to meet earnings expectations produces economically large return di↵er-
ences that are not explained by standard risk factors. For example, the loadings on EARF
are insignificant for the hedge portfolios formed on fitted dispersion, suggesting the return
spreads are not explained by earnings announcement premia. The loadings on MKTRF
suggest the fitted dispersion portfolio returns are orthogonal to the market factor, while
the negative loading on SMB and weak positive loading on UMD are consistent with both
Veenman and Verwijmeren [2018] and Johnson et al. [2020].
4.6. Di↵erences in returns in pre-earnings announcement months
To provide some more insights into the nature of the mispricing that explains the disper-
sion anomaly, in the Online Appendix we also examine return predictability based on EMI
and PESS in month t   1. As discussed in Section 3.1, EMI and PESS measure comple-
mentary aspects of the earnings expectations game. While expectations management and
forecast pessimism have similar implications for the predictability of earnings surprises and
13Consistent with the dispersion anomaly and investor mispricing of forecast pessimism being stronger
in smaller firms (Diether et al. [2002]; Veenman and Verwijmeren [2018]), untabulated tests reveal that the
value-weighted risk-adjusted portfolio returns are somewhat smaller at 67 basis points for both annual and
quarterly forecast dispersion, respectively, but still significant with t-values equal to 2.61 and 2.85.
18
announcement returns, and therefore have similar implications for the relation between dis-
persion and announcement returns, the expected relations with returns in the period before
earnings announcements di↵er. In the Online Appendix, we explain the conceptual intuition
behind this prediction and show how EMI and PESS have di↵erent relations with the returns
in pre-earnings announcement months. Consistent with Johnson et al. [2020], we find that
portfolios sorted by the EMI measure produce significant return spreads in month t   1 in
the opposite direction of those observed for month t. In contrast, we do not find significant
return spreads in month t  1 when we focus on the PESS measures. These results suggest
that the mispricing induced by expectations management manifests in the period before the
earnings announcement (and reverses at the earnings announcement), while the mispricing
induced by forecast pessimism manifests at the earnings announcement.14
5. Additional tests based on earnings announcement data
5.1. Forecast dispersion and short-window earnings announcement returns
In Table 6, we turn to our sample of firm-quarters to assess the relation between dis-
persion and announcement-window returns (BHAR[0,2]t ) in a multiple regression framework.
Although the results in Table 3 suggest that the alternative di↵erences-of-opinion variables
(return volatility, earnings volatility, and turnover) have no significant incremental relation
with monthly returns, Berkman et al. [2009] conclude that these variables are strongly neg-
atively related to short-window announcement returns. Moreover, by focusing on the actual
earnings announcement we can examine the e↵ects of controlling for the ex-post earnings
surprise.
The control variables included in the regressions are similar to those included in Table 3,
14PESS might be associated with a reversal of mispricing after earnings announcements. However, the
most likely event at which the mispricing could reverse is at the subsequent earnings announcement, which is
when firms with PESS-induced positive earnings surprises typically report another positive earnings surprise.
Our tests in the Online Appendix support this lack of a reversal of mispricing. We find that the returns for
high-PESS firms significantly exceed those of low-PESS firms when we examine all months unconditionally
(i.e., when we do not condition on the month being an (expected) announcement month). This result is in
line with prior research that finds that firms that meet expectations have higher full-quarter returns than
firms that miss expectations (e.g., Bartov et al. [2002]; Kasznik and McNichols [2002]).
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except that we replace the prior return variables by short-window returns measured before
the earnings announcement. Because dispersion can be viewed as a measure of information
uncertainty before earnings announcements, we include the daily size-adjusted returns before
the earnings announcement to control for information-driven return reversals (So and Wang
[2014]; Levi and Zhang [2015]). We include separate variables for the five daily abnormal
returns before the earnings announcement date (AR[ ⌧ ]t ), as well as the buy-and-hold ab-
normal returns measured from day -10 through -6 (BHAR[ 10, 6]t ). Moreover, the return
volatility and turnover variables are now measured relative to the earnings announcement
date instead of the start of the announcement month.
We first present results without controlling for di↵erences-of-opinion measures. The re-
sults reveal significant di↵erences in announcement returns between high- and low-dispersion
firms. Based on annual (quarterly) forecast dispersion, low-dispersion firms have three-day
announcement returns that are 63 (56) basis points higher than high-dispersion firms. These
return di↵erences become somewhat smaller when we include the di↵erences-of-opinion vari-
ables, which suggests that analyst dispersion shares predictive power for short-window an-
nouncement returns with these variables. Still, the return di↵erences between low- and
high-dispersion firms remain significant over the short window (32 and 31 basis points based
on annual and quarterly forecast dispersion, respectively, with t-values of 3.77 and 4.41).
Lastly, we control for the value of the earnings surprise (Surpriset) and find that the
significant negative relation between dispersion and announcement returns disappears. This
result is consistent with biased earnings expectations explaining the negative relation of
dispersion with announcement returns.
5.2. Evidence on the mechanism
5.2.1. Dispersion and firms’ ex-post propensity to meet or beat expectations
In this section we examine the association between analyst dispersion and firms’ ex-
post meeting or beating of analyst expectations, while controlling for the other variables
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included in Table 6. The only adjustment we make to the control variables is that we
aggregate the individual daily pre-announcement return variables and extend the return
variable measurement to 60 trading days. This adjustment controls for the result that
analysts’ forecasts tend to be relatively stale by the time of the earnings announcement,
which leads to predictable variation in earnings surprises.
Panel A of Table 7 presents the results from quarterly logit regressions of an indicator
variable Meett, which is set equal to 1 for firms that meet expectations, and 0 otherwise,
on forecast dispersion and control variables. The results suggest both annual and quarterly
forecast dispersion variables are strongly negatively related to firms’ propensity to meet
expectations. Holding all else constant, firms in the lowest decile of dispersion are 22–23
percentage points more likely to report earnings that meet analyst expectations than firms
in the highest decile of dispersion.
Among the control variables, the only variable that comes close to the predictive power
of dispersion is the lagged return variable. Consistent with the staleness of the analyst
consensus, firms in the highest return decile are 18 percentage points more likely to meet
expectations. The marginal e↵ects of the other variables are substantially weaker. For ex-
ample, among the di↵erences-of-opinion variables from Berkman et al. [2009], only return
volatility has a significant negative association with meeting expectations. In terms of mag-
nitude, however, the association of dispersion with meeting expectations is more than five
times as strong. Earnings volatility is instead significantly positively associated with meeting
expectations, while the coe cients on turnover are insignificant. These results suggest that
analyst dispersion relates to announcement returns through a di↵erent mechanism than the
di↵erences-of-opinion measures of Berkman et al. [2009].
Figure 2 provides additional insights into the relation between dispersion and earnings
surprises. For the firms in portfolios Q1 (low dispersion) and Q5 (high dispersion) based
on annual forecast dispersion, we separately plot the frequency distribution of earnings sur-
prises. The low-dispersion firms clearly have a substantially stronger asymmetry in the
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earnings surprise distribution compared to high-dispersion firms. Consistent with Bissessur
and Veenman [2016], low-dispersion firms are more likely to just beat quarterly earnings ex-
pectations and high-dispersion firms are more likely to just miss expectations. The striking
di↵erence in the frequency distributions underscores the strong link between dispersion and
firms’ propensity to meet earnings expectations.
5.2.2. Explanations for the link between analyst dispersion and meet-or-beat incidence
This section presents tests of the mechanisms we proposed in Section 2. In Panel B of
Table 7, we examine firms’ use of public guidance to explain the within-quarter negative
relation between analyst dispersion and meeting expectations. These tests are similar in
spirit to those from Cotter et al. [2006], who examine how public guidance relates to pre-
guidance forecast dispersion and how guidance a↵ects firms’ ability to meet expectations.
We extend these tests to examine how guidance a↵ects dispersion. Similar to Cotter et al.
[2006], we use a firm- and time-fixed e↵ects design to test how variation in a firm’s decision to
provide public guidance (Guidet) a↵ects dispersion and the propensity to meet expectations.
For each of the firm-quarters in our sample of firms that provide earnings guidance at
least once during the post-1998 period (Chuk et al. [2013]), we create two data points and
measure Meett and DispQt using the consensus forecast measured either 120 days or 1 day
before the earnings announcement. We next create an indicator variable Postt that is set
equal to 1 for those data points measured 1 day before the earnings announcement (i.e., post-
guidance), and 0 for data points measured 120 days before the earnings announcement. The
coe cient on the interaction between Guidet and Postt provides the di↵erence-in-di↵erence
estimator, which quantifies the within-firm-quarter e↵ect of guidance on dispersion.15
The baseline results are consistent with Cotter et al. [2006]. First, firm-quarters with
guidance are associated with more optimistic initial forecasts as guiding firms are less likely
15The results are similar (untabulated) when we include firm-year-quarter fixed e↵ects. We display the
results using separate firm- and year-quarter fixed e↵ects because it allows us to tabulate and interpret the
main e↵ect on Guide.
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to meet the day -120 consensus forecast. Second, the positive significant interaction between
Guidet and Postt in the first column suggests that guidance significantly enhances firms’
ability to meet expectations. Third, firm-quarters with guidance are associated with sig-
nificantly lower dispersion at the beginning of the quarter. Most importantly, these tests
reveal that public guidance significantly lowers forecast dispersion. The negative coe cient
on Guide⇥ Postt indicates that the general reduction in dispersion before the earnings an-
nouncement is significantly stronger when firms provide public earnings guidance, which is
consistent with our prediction.
Figure 3 visualizes the e↵ect of public guidance on dispersion. For the 120-day window
before the earnings announcement, we plot the average daily dispersion in quarterly earnings
forecasts. In the left-hand graph, we plot the trajectory of dispersion separately for firm-
quarters with and without public earnings guidance. The figure reveals a substantially
stronger reduction in forecast dispersion in guidance firm-quarters. Consistent with guidance
taking place mostly around the previous-quarter earnings announcement, we also see that
this reduction in dispersion materializes most strongly around day -90. The right-hand graph
provides similar insights, but now based on firms that are more versus less likely engaged in
expectations management given their recent history of meeting or beating expectations.
As further support of the proposed mechanism for the relation between dispersion and
firms’ propensity to meet expectations, we present the following insights in the Online Ap-
pendix. First, we provide descriptive statistics for portfolios formed on firms’ recent history
of meeting expectations, to provide an understanding of how the repeated nature of the earn-
ings expectations game is associated with reduced analyst dispersion for firms over time. We
find that firms with the highest frequency of meeting expectations are associated with signif-
icantly less volatile earnings surprises than firms with the lowest frequency. We further find
that analysts forecasts closer to the prevailing consensus for firms meeting expectations more
frequently, they are more likely to lowball their forecasts by one or two cents below actual
earnings, and their forecasts are significantly more likely to reduce forecast dispersion. In
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addition, in tests examining how meeting or beating earnings expectations is associated with
dispersion across quarters, we find that meeting or beating expectations in one additional
quarter is associated with lower forecast dispersion in the following quarter.
5.3. Forecast dispersion and pre-earnings announcement returns
In the Online Appendix, we further di↵erentiate the announcement return di↵erences
related to dispersion from earnings announcement premia. Prior research finds that earnings
announcement premia materialize primarily in the days before the earnings announcement
(Barber et al. [2013]; Johnson and So [2018]). If di↵erences in earnings announcement pre-
mia explain the negative relation between earnings announcement returns and dispersion,
we should observe a positive relation with returns in the days before the earnings announce-
ment. The results from our analysis suggest there is no significant positive relation between
dispersion and pre-announcement returns. In contrast, we find that each of the di↵erences-
of-opinion variables from Berkman et al. [2009] has a significant positive association with
pre-announcement returns. Hence, we conclude that the return patterns of the dispersion
variables around earnings announcements are not consistent with explanations based on
di↵erences of opinion or earnings announcement premia.
6. Summary and conclusions
This paper extends the set of potential explanations for the dispersion anomaly by ex-
amining the role of firms’ propensity to meet analyst earnings expectations. We first demon-
strate that the negative relation between dispersion and returns is concentrated around earn-
ings announcements. Next, we find that this negative relation disappears when we control
for ex-ante measures of firms’ propensity to meet earnings expectations based on Johnson
et al. [2020] and Veenman and Verwijmeren [2018]. These measures are negatively related
to dispersion and positively related to returns, which suggests they are omitted correlated
variables in the relation between dispersion and returns. Moreover, despite these ex-ante
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measures explaining only a small portion of the variation in dispersion, we find that the
variation of dispersion explained by the measures explains all of the return predictability of
dispersion. The residual values of dispersion are not associated with returns, while hedge
portfolios based on fitted values produce strong risk-adjusted returns.
Using actual earnings announcement data, we find that firms with low analyst disper-
sion are significantly more likely to achieve positive earnings surprises and that, relative to
other variables, dispersion is an economically strong predictor of firms’ propensity to meet
expectations. In other words, this result suggests that portfolio sorts of firms by analyst
dispersion, as in Diether et al. [2002], also produce sorts on the ex-ante likelihood that firms
report earnings that meet analyst expectations. We provide new insights that are consistent
with both expectations management and the repeated nature of the earnings expectations
game explaining this link. For example, firms that provide public earnings guidance experi-
ence significantly greater reductions in forecast dispersion over the quarter than firms that
do not provide such guidance.
Overall, our results suggest that investors’ inability to fully unravel firms’ propensity to
play the earnings expectations game provides a viable explanation for the dispersion anomaly.
An interesting avenue for future research is to examine how alternative explanations for
the dispersion anomaly have varying importance over time. For example, the increased
availability of lendable shares in recent years has likely reduced the importance of short-
sale constraints as an explanation. Moreover, the growing body of academic insights into
the pricing e↵ects of firms’ propensity to play the earnings expectations game (Veenman
and Verwijmeren [2018]; Johnson et al. [2020]), and related coverage in the financial press
(e.g., Gryta et al. [2016]; Zweig [2018]), potentially decrease the magnitude of the dispersion
anomaly in the future.
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Appendix A. Variable definitions
Aget = Firm age, measured as the number of months since the firm’s first appearance in CRSP.
Analystst = Number of analyst forecasts used to construct the dispersion variable in the monthly data;
number of analysts used to construct the current-quarter earnings surprise in the quarterly data.
AR
[ ⌧ ]
t = Daily size-adjusted return on day ⌧ relative to the earnings announcement date, where ⌧ 2
{ 5, 4, 3, 2, 1}; size-adjusted returns are computed relative to the CRSP value-weighted market cap-
italization index based NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ cuto↵s (CRSP file ERDPORT1).
BHAR
[0,2]
t = Buy-and-hold size-adjusted stock returns for the firm-quarter, measured from the date of the
earnings announcement through two days after the earnings announcement.
BHAR
[ ⌧, ✓]
t = Buy-and-hold size-adjusted returns over trading days  ⌧ through  ✓ relative to the earn-
ings announcement date.
BtMt = Book-to-market ratio, measured using the most recent quarter book value of common equity (Com-
pustat: CEQ) scaled by the market value of equity; where market value is measured in the monthly data
using CRSP data and measured in the quarterly data using end-of-quarter Compustat data (Compustat:
PRCCQ ⇥ CSHOQ).
DispAt = Dispersion in analysts’ forecasts of earnings per share (EPS), measured in the previous month
using the standard deviation of individual analysts’ forecasts of annual EPS obtained from the unadjusted
IBES Summary History files (FPI = 1), scaled by the absolute value of the mean consensus forecast; for
those cases where the mean consensus forecast is zero, DispAt is set equal to the maximum sample value.
DispQt = Dispersion in analysts’ forecasts of EPS, measured in the previous month using the standard
deviation of individual analysts’ forecasts of quarterly EPS obtained from the unadjusted IBES Summary
History files (FPI = 6), scaled by the absolute value of the mean consensus forecast; for those cases where
the mean consensus forecast is zero, DispQt is set equal to the maximum sample value.
EMIt 1 = Ex-ante measure of expectations management incentives constructed following Johnson et al.
[2020] as the first principle component of variables associated with managers’ incentives to manage earnings
expectations; for each sample month with su cient data in CRSP and Compustat for firms listed on NYSE,
AMEX, or NASDAQ with a lagged stock price of at least $1 and an earnings announcement in Compustat
12 months earlier, we rank three variables into percentiles (analyst coverage, institutional ownership, and
loss frequency in the most recent 12 (minimum one) quarters, where all variables are measured 12 months
earlier) and compute EMIt 1 as the first principal component of the monthly percentile ranks.
Evolt = The standard deviation of earnings scaled by total assets (Compustat: IBQ / ATQ) in the previous
20 quarters, with a minimum of four quarters of prior earnings data required.
Guidet = Indicator variable set equal to 1 for firms with earnings guidance, and 0 otherwise, based on guid-
ance identified in the IBES Guidance files in the 120 days before the earnings announcement; this variable
is restricted to post-1998 data to alleviate concerns with non-random coverage of earnings guidance (Chuk
et al. [2013]).
Instt = Percentage of a firm’s common shares outstanding held by institutions at the end of the most
recently completed calendar quarter, from 13-F Filings in the Thomson Reuters’ Institutional Holdings
Database (S34).
Levt = Leverage, measured using the end-of-quarter t ratio of long-term debt (Compustat: DLTT + DLC)
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to total assets (Compustat: ATQ).
Meett = Indicator variable set equal to 1 if Surpriset is non-negative, 0 otherwise.
PESS
C
t 1 = Ex-ante measure of consensus analyst forecast pessimism following Veenman and Verwijmeren
[2018], measured as the fraction of the previous 12 quarters in which the firm reported earnings per share
that beat (Surprise > 0) instead of missed (Surprise < 0) consensus analyst expectations, requiring a
minimum of four prior nonzero quarterly earnings surprises.
PESS
I
t 1 = Ex-ante measure of individual analyst forecast pessimism following Veenman and Verwijmeren
[2018] based on individual analysts’ past forecast errors; this measure is computed from the average frequency
with which any firm beat (instead of missed) the individual analyst’s forecasts over the preceding 12-month
period, which is then aggregated for all individual analysts that cover a particular firm-quarter.
Rett = Raw monthly stock return from the CRSP monthly stock files in month t.
RetX
[0,2]
t = Raw monthly stock return from the CRSP monthly stock files for a firm’s earnings announce-
ment month, adjusted for the raw returns in the earnings announcement window [0,2].
Retvolt = The standard deviation of daily size-adjusted returns measured over the period from 55 through
11 days before the (expected) earnings announcement (month).
Sizet = Firm size based on market capitalization; measured in the monthly data using CRSP data; mea-
sured in the quarterly data using end-of-quarter t stock price (Compustat: PRCCQ) multiplied by the total
number of shares outstanding (Compustat: CSHOQ).
Surpriset = Actual EPS for the firm-quarter obtained from the IBES Unadjusted files, less the mean con-
sensus forecast measured using each individual analyst’s latest forecast from the IBES detail files; forecasts
older than 180 days are eliminated; the forecasts are adjusted for stock splits between the forecast date and
earnings announcement dates using the CRSP cumulative factor to adjust prices (CFACPR).
Turnt = Turnover, measured as the average daily ratio of trading volume to shares outstanding in the win-
dow from 55 through 11 days before the (expected) earnings announcement (month).
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Figure 1
Causal diagrams explaining the conceptual relations between the earnings expectations
management game and analyst forecast dispersion
This figure provides causal diagrams using directed acyclic graphs (Pearl [1995]; Morgan and Winship
[2015]; Gow et al. [2016]). Solid dots indicate observable constructs and hollow dots indicate unobservable
constructs. The solid lines capture causal chains, while the dashed bidirected lines capture non-causal
associations between constructs. Panel A depicts the within firm-quarter conceptual links between
expectations management, forecast dispersion, and firm’s propensity to meet or beat analyst expectations.
See Section 2.1 for the argumentation and references behind these causal chains. Panel B depicts the
conceptual links across quarters between persistent pessimism in analyst forecasts, forecast dispersion, and
firm’s propensity to meet or beat analyst expectations, which further strengthens the negative relation
between dispersion and firms’ propensity to meet or beat analyst expectations. See Section 2.2 for the
argumentation and references behind these causal chains. Abbreviation EXM refers to expectations
management, while MBE refers to meeting or beating analyst expectations. Subscripts t and t  1 refer to
firm-quarters in event time.


























Frequency distribution of earnings surprises for low- and high-dispersion firms
Frequency distributions (kernel density plots) of quarterly earnings surprises (Surpriset) for firms in the
lowest quintile (Q1, solid red line) and firms in the highest quintile (Q5, dashed blue line) of analyst forecast
dispersion. Analyst forecast dispersion is measured as the coe cient of variation in analysts’ forecasts of
annual earnings (DispAt) in the month before a quarterly earnings announcement. Quintile portfolios
of forecast dispersion are created each quarter and kernel density plots are based on the Guassian kernel
function and a bandwidth of one. See Appendix A for details on the definitions of variables DispAt and



















The evolution of forecast dispersion within the quarter
This figure presents insights on the evolution of forecast dispersion before firms’ quarterly earnings
announcements. We plot the level of forecast dispersion separately for firms that are more versus less likely
engaged in the earnings expectations game. For each earnings announcement in our sample, we compute
a consensus earnings forecast on day ⌧ using a moving window that captures analysts’ latest forecasts
of quarterly earnings issued over the (maximum) 180 days before day ⌧ . Day ⌧ forecast dispersion is
measured as the standard deviation of the forecasts in the day ⌧ consensus scaled by the absolute value of
the consensus forecast on day -120. For each day ⌧ , we plot the mean of the natural logarithm of forecast
dispersion relative to the day -120 value, such that values on the vertical axis can be interpreted as the
average percentage change in forecast dispersion within the quarter. To capture firms’ potential involvement
in the earnings expectations game, the left-hand figure displays the evolution of forecast dispersion
separately for firms identified as providing guidance, versus those that do not, using the IBES Guidance
data for the post-1998 part of our sample (Chuk et al. [2013]). The right-hand figure plots the evolution of
forecast dispersion separately for firms with high versus low frequencies of meeting or beating consensus
expectations (MBE) in the previous 12 quarters (using a minimum of four previous earnings surprises).
Firms are labeled as having a high (low) MBE frequency when the fraction of quarters meeting or beat-







































































Sample selection and descriptive statistics
Construction of monthly return dataset Security-months
Observations with return data in CRSP for months 1993:04–2019:03 2,292,363
– Not listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ -155,440
– Add delisting return months 13,567
– Stock price below $1 at end of previous month -77,104
– Dispersion variables not available in previous month -1,102,173
Sample for basic dispersion anomaly tests (Table 2) 971,213
– Expected earnings announcement months (Table 2) 295,606
– Sample with basic controls and PESS and EMI measures (Tables 3–5) 277,690
Construction of earnings announcement dataset Firm-quarters
Unique firm-quarters in CRSP/Compustat for fiscal periods ending in calendar quar-
ters 1993Q1 through 2018Q4 with positive total assets and non-missing net income
(IBQ), stock price (PRCCQ), and shares outstanding (CSHOQ)
604,487
– Firm not listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ -4,617
– Stock price below $1 at fiscal quarter end -24,857
– Missing earnings announcement date in Compustat -43,761
– Missing earnings surprise data in IBES -163,036
– Earnings announcement dates di↵er by > 2 trading days -6,753
– Earnings announcement return data not available in CRSP -7,823
– Dispersion variables not available in month before earnings announcement -58,217
– Data on control variables missing -4,649
Sample with dispersion variables and earnings announcement data (Tables 6–7) 290,774
Notes: This table presents the procedures used to construct (1) a sample of firm-month observations for
tests of the dispersion anomaly and (2) a sample of firm-quarters for tests of earnings announcement news.
The firm-month sample covers the 312 months from April 1993 through March 2019 to match the selection
of firm-quarters ending in calendar quarters 1993Q1–2018Q4. Expected earnings announcement months are
defined based on quarterly earnings announcements made in the same month one year earlier. See Appendix
A for variable definitions.
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Table 2
Analyst forecast dispersion, stock returns, and earnings announcements
Panel A: Average returns by monthly dispersion quintile based on annual earnings forecasts
EA vs.
Dispersion portfolio non-EA
Q1 (low) Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 (high) Q1–Q5 di↵.
All 0.908 0.839 0.781 0.661 0.477 0.430
(3.55)*** (2.91)*** (2.35)** (1.69)* (1.02) (1.52)
All (alphas) 0.252 0.140 0.057 -0.107 -0.302 0.554
(3.10)*** (1.99)** (1.01) (-1.27) (-2.47)** (3.34)***
EA (exp) 1.350 1.207 0.985 0.887 0.701 0.649
(5.04)*** (3.99)*** (2.80)*** (2.15)** (1.46) (2.15)**
Non-EA (exp) 0.721 0.686 0.685 0.630 0.484 0.237 0.413
(2.67)*** (2.37)** (2.10)** (1.63) (1.05) (0.81) (2.06)**
EA (act) 1.382 1.194 0.934 0.980 0.638 0.744
(5.01)*** (3.77)*** (2.60)*** (2.30)** (1.28) (2.37)**
Non-EA (act) 0.672 0.633 0.620 0.565 0.454 0.218 0.525
(2.47)** (2.14)** (1.86)* (1.44) (0.98) (0.75) (2.66)***
BHAR
[0,2]
t 0.246 0.115 -0.170 -0.205 -0.366 0.612
(4.73)*** (1.76)* (-2.63)*** (-2.81)*** (-3.39)*** (4.93)***
RetX
[0,2]
t 1.266 1.297 1.277 1.408 1.280 -0.014
(5.33)*** (4.87)*** (4.31)*** (3.96)*** (3.06)*** (-0.05)
Panel B: Average returns by monthly dispersion quintile based on quarterly earnings forecasts
EA vs.
Dispersion portfolio non-EA
Q1 (low) Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 (high) Q1–Q5 di↵.
All 0.903 0.859 0.738 0.682 0.479 0.425
(3.20)*** (3.02)*** (2.25)** (1.75)* (1.09) (2.10)**
All (alphas) 0.205 0.175 0.027 -0.065 -0.310 0.515
(2.85)*** (2.54)** (0.48) (-0.74) (-2.87)*** (3.98)***
EA (exp) 1.187 1.350 1.150 0.922 0.586 0.601
(3.83)*** (4.60)*** (3.44)*** (2.17)** (1.31) (2.74)***
Non-EA (exp) 0.806 0.664 0.606 0.652 0.509 0.297 0.304
(2.85)*** (2.30)** (1.87)* (1.72)* (1.17) (1.38) (1.68)*
EA (act) 1.281 1.342 1.178 0.861 0.541 0.740
(4.06)*** (4.32)*** (3.38)*** (2.03)** (1.18) (3.54)***
Non-EA (act) 0.741 0.589 0.533 0.592 0.504 0.237 0.503
(2.58)** (2.01)** (1.61) (1.53) (1.15) (1.12) (3.15)***
BHAR
[0,2]
t 0.138 0.144 -0.010 -0.218 -0.388 0.526
(2.46)** (2.37)** (-0.14) (-2.74)*** (-3.91)*** (4.73)***
RetX
[0,2]
t 1.263 1.337 1.370 1.352 1.260 0.004
(4.79)*** (5.17)*** (4.49)*** (3.89)*** (3.29)*** (0.02)
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Notes: This table presents time-series averages of monthly stock returns (Rett) for quintile portfolios
formed based on forecast dispersion. The sample consists of security-month observations for the 312 months
from April 1993 through March 2019. CRSP delisting returns are included and adjusted for missing values
following Shumway and Warther [1999]. See Table 1 for sample selection details. Forecast dispersion is
measured from the IBES Summary History files using forecasts of annual earnings (DispAt, Panel A) and
forecasts of quarterly earnings (DispQt, Panel B) in the previous month. Quintile portfolios are constructed
for each of the 312 months in the sample using the previous-month ranks of the dispersion variable. Alphas
are calculated as the intercept from Fama-French four-factor model regressions. EA (non-EA) refers to
security-months with (without) an earnings announcement. We distinguish between expected “(exp)”
and actual “(act)” earnings announcement months, where expected earnings announcement months are
extrapolated from the same-quarter earnings announcement one year earlier and earnings announcement
dates are from Compustat (RDQ). The earnings announcement return variables BHAR[0,2]t and RETX
[0,2]
t
are measured relative to the earnings announcement date as identified in Table 1. See Appendix A for
details on the forecast dispersion and return variable definitions. Average return values are multiplied by
100 for presentation purposes. t-statistics are based on time series averages and standard errors adjusted for
autocorrelation using Newey and West [1987] and five lags. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance
at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively.
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Table 3
Cross-sectional regressions explaining returns in expected announcement months
Rett Rett Rett Rett Rett Rett
Test variables:
DispAt 1 -0.607 -0.608 -0.273
(-2.72)*** (-3.81)*** (-1.26)
DispQt 1 -0.620 -0.580 -0.293
(-3.38)*** (-3.59)*** (-1.67)*
Control variables:
Sizet 1 -0.006 -0.717 -0.568 -0.013 -0.749 -0.568
(-0.02) (-1.89)* (-1.70)* (-0.04) (-1.96)* (-1.66)*
BtMt 1 0.755 0.792 0.619 0.774 0.817 0.649
(2.29)** (3.39)*** (2.16)** (2.33)** (3.47)*** (2.24)**
Rett 1 -0.887 -0.963 -0.894 -0.866 -0.938 -0.877
(-3.27)*** (-3.74)*** (-3.30)*** (-3.19)*** (-3.67)*** (-3.25)***
Rett 12,t 2 1.113 1.233 1.157 1.139 1.272 1.178

























n 277,690 272,089 277,690 277,690 272,089 277,690
n (months) 312 312 312 312 312 312
Average adj. R2 0.042 0.062 0.048 0.040 0.062 0.047
Notes: This table presents average coe cient estimates obtained from monthly cross-sectional regressions
of returns on forecast dispersion and control variables in expected earnings announcement months. Average
coe cients are multiplied by 100 for presentation purposes. All independent variables are transformed into
monthly decile ranks, scaled between -0.5 and 0.5. See Appendix A for details on the variable definitions.
t-statistics are based on time series averages and standard errors adjusted for autocorrelation using Newey




Explaining forecast dispersion with ex-ante measures of expectations management
incentives and forecast pessimism
Panel A: Descriptive for portfolios formed on expectations management incentives and forecast pessimism
EMIt 1 portfolio
Q1 (low) Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 (high) Q5–Q1 t-stat.
Meett 0.598 0.630 0.669 0.695 0.741 0.143 16.78***
Rett 0.636 1.361 1.483 1.519 1.523 0.887 3.34***
DispAt 1 0.078 0.057 0.043 0.032 0.024 -0.054 -18.60***




Meett 0.510 0.604 0.672 0.739 0.836 0.326 46.13***
Rett 0.649 1.095 1.229 1.137 1.445 0.797 4.35***
DispAt 1 0.084 0.058 0.040 0.030 0.021 -0.063 -19.73***




Meett 0.531 0.613 0.668 0.728 0.794 0.262 30.14***
Rett 0.662 0.971 1.042 1.386 1.473 0.811 3.96***
DispAt 1 0.073 0.050 0.039 0.032 0.027 -0.045 -13.46***
DispQt 1 0.127 0.093 0.076 0.062 0.049 -0.078 -14.65***
Panel B: Cross-sectional regressions explaining variation in dispersion with ex-ante measures
ln(DispAt 1) ln(DispAt 1) ln(DispAt 1) ln(DispQt 1) ln(DispQt 1) ln(DispQt 1)
EMIt 1 -0.393 -0.262 -0.310 -0.171
(-29.92)*** (-18.81)*** (-28.16)*** (-15.19)***
PESS
C
t 1 -1.670 -1.438 -1.524 -1.366
(-41.12)*** (-41.81)*** (-32.08)*** (-31.04)***
PESS
I
t 1 -1.317 -1.062 -1.811 -1.656
(-11.69)*** (-9.84)*** (-21.44)*** (-20.45)***
n 277,690 277,690 277,690 277,690 277,690 277,690
n (months) 312 312 312 312 312 312
Avg. adj. R2 0.072 0.115 0.147 0.035 0.083 0.094
Panel C: Return predictability of fitted and residual components of dispersion
Dispt 1 = ln(DispAt 1) Dispt 1 = ln(DispQt 1)
Rett Rett Rett Rett Rett Rett
Test variables:
Fitted Dispt 1 -1.221 -1.233 -1.123 -1.140
(-5.98)*** (-5.92)*** (-6.01)*** (-6.03)***
Residual Dispt 1 -0.093 -0.160 -0.135 -0.207
(-0.49) (-0.82) (-0.82) (-1.23)
p-value di↵erence [0.0002] [0.0003]
Control variables Included Included Included Included Included Included
n 277,690 277,690 277,690 277,690 277,690 277,690
n (months) 312 312 312 312 312 312
Average adj. R2 0.041 0.041 0.044 0.041 0.039 0.043
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Notes: Panel A presents time-series averages of variables Meett, Rett, DispAt 1, and DispQt 1, for
monthly quintile portfolios formed on variables EMIt 1, PESSCt 1, and PESS
I
t 1. Panel B presents
average coe cient estimates obtained from monthly cross-sectional regressions of the natural logarithm of
forecast dispersion on EMIt 1, PESSCt 1, and PESS
I
t 1. Panel C presents average coe cient estimates
obtained from monthly cross-sectional regressions of returns on fitted and residual forecast dispersion and
control variables (Sizet 1, BtMt 1, Rett 1, and Rett 12,t 2), where fitted and residual forecast dispersion
are obtained from the first-stage estimations in Panel B including EMIt 1, PESSCt 1, and PESS
I
t 1. In
Panel C, average coe cients are multiplied by 100 for presentation purposes and independent variables
(including untabulated control variables) are transformed into monthly decile ranks, scaled between -0.5
and 0.5. See Appendix A for the variable definitions. t-statistics are based on time series averages and
standard errors adjusted for autocorrelation using Newey and West [1987] and five lags. *, **, and ***
represent statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively.
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Table 5
Portfolio regression tests based on fitted and residual dispersion variables
Panel A: Monthly portfolios formed on fitted and residual annual dispersion
Fitted ln(DispAt) Residual ln(DispAt) Fitted  
Q1 Q5 Q1–Q5 Q1 Q5 Q1–Q5 Residual
Alpha 0.568 -0.376 0.944 0.318 0.154 0.164 0.781
(4.73)*** (-2.38)** (4.81)*** (3.20)*** (0.92) (0.98) (3.16)***
MKTRF 1.054 1.108 -0.054 0.915 1.221 -0.306 0.253
(25.49)*** (24.73)*** (-0.80) (30.31)*** (35.57)*** (-6.84)*** (3.03)***
SMB 0.339 0.958 -0.620 0.530 0.982 -0.452 -0.168
(2.43)** (16.83)*** (-3.56)*** (8.21)*** (17.12)*** (-7.43)*** (-1.05)
HML 0.209 0.209 -0.000 0.299 0.221 0.079 -0.079
(2.46)** (2.36)** (-0.00) (6.05)*** (4.19)*** (1.19) (-0.52)
UMD -0.097 -0.222 0.125 -0.029 -0.392 0.363 -0.238
(-2.14)** (-6.53)*** (1.80)* (-0.95) (-10.92)*** (6.72)*** (-2.92)***
EARF 0.177 0.016 0.161 0.188 0.023 0.165 -0.003
(2.30)** (0.14) (1.24) (3.09)*** (0.28) (1.65) (-0.02)
Panel B: Monthly portfolios formed on fitted and residual quarterly dispersion
Fitted ln(DispQt) Residual ln(DispQt) Fitted  
Q1 Q5 Q1–Q5 Q1 Q5 Q1–Q5 Residual
Alpha 0.648 -0.430 1.078 0.293 0.048 0.245 0.833
(5.10)*** (-3.13)*** (6.09)*** (2.80)*** (0.29) (1.43) (3.46)***
MKTRF 1.036 1.097 -0.061 0.979 1.212 -0.234 0.172
(22.20)*** (26.27)*** (-0.91) (32.58)*** (31.39)*** (-5.71)*** (2.17)**
SMB 0.406 0.872 -0.467 0.557 0.894 -0.337 -0.130
(2.63)*** (19.05)*** (-2.80)*** (8.66)*** (15.85)*** (-5.72)*** (-0.81)
HML 0.149 0.315 -0.166 0.219 0.203 0.016 -0.182
(1.96)* (3.99)*** (-1.40) (4.40)*** (3.50)*** (0.23) (-1.36)
UMD -0.112 -0.229 0.117 -0.038 -0.326 0.288 -0.171
(-3.28)*** (-7.69)*** (2.46)** (-1.35) (-8.36)*** (5.20)*** (-2.26)**
EARF 0.162 0.149 0.013 0.139 0.122 0.018 -0.004
(2.42)** (1.29) (0.10) (1.84)* (1.35) (0.20) (-0.03)
Notes: This table presents the results from calendar-time portfolio regressions using a Fama-French
four-factor model augmented with an earnings announcement return factor (EARF ). MKTRF , SMB,
HML, and UMD are the Fama-French factors obtained through WRDS. Following Johnson et al. [2020],
EARF is defined as the monthly di↵erence between the value weighted return on a portfolio of firms
expected to announce earnings and the value weighted return on a portfolio of firms not expected to
announce earnings. In each of the 312 months in the sample, we rank observations into quintile portfolios
based on the fitted and residual values obtained from the regressions in Table 4 for annual (Panel A) and
quarterly (Panel B) forecast dispersion. The forecast dispersion variables are defined as in Appendix A.
t-statistics are based on standard errors adjusted for autocorrelation using Newey and West [1987] and five
lags. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively.
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Table 6















DispAt -0.629 -0.323 0.121
(-5.54)*** (-3.77)*** (1.16)
DispQt -0.560 -0.310 0.071
(-6.30)*** (-4.41)*** (0.98)
Control variables:
Sizet 0.281 -0.075 -1.038 0.314 -0.080 -1.044
(1.89)* (-0.47) (-6.99)*** (1.97)* (-0.49) (-7.02)***
BtMt 0.643 0.345 0.401 0.648 0.338 0.409
(6.30)*** (4.47)*** (4.70)*** (6.35)*** (4.54)*** (4.84)***
AR
[ 1]
t -1.419 -1.434 -1.843 -1.416 -1.433 -1.842
(-10.56)*** (-10.70)*** (-13.52)*** (-10.51)*** (-10.68)*** (-13.51)***
AR
[ 2]
t -0.839 -0.861 -1.129 -0.836 -0.860 -1.128
(-6.14)*** (-6.25)*** (-8.31)*** (-6.11)*** (-6.23)*** (-8.30)***
AR
[ 3]
t -0.484 -0.504 -0.734 -0.478 -0.500 -0.731
(-3.94)*** (-4.03)*** (-5.65)*** (-3.87)*** (-3.99)*** (-5.62)***
AR
[ 4]
t -0.449 -0.473 -0.662 -0.447 -0.473 -0.661
(-3.86)*** (-4.03)*** (-5.36)*** (-3.82)*** (-4.01)*** (-5.34)***
AR
[ 5]
t -0.282 -0.300 -0.481 -0.276 -0.296 -0.478
(-2.70)*** (-2.85)*** (-4.54)*** (-2.65)*** (-2.82)*** (-4.52)***
BHAR
[ 10, 6]
t -0.353 -0.382 -0.730 -0.350 -0.382 -0.730
(-3.22)*** (-3.47)*** (-6.62)*** (-3.23)*** (-3.51)*** (-6.68)***
Levt -0.138 -0.257 0.012 -0.126 -0.257 0.006
(-1.56) (-2.63)*** (0.11) (-1.44) (-2.65)*** (0.05)
Aget 0.182 -0.015 0.138 0.198 -0.014 0.128
(1.34) (-0.17) (1.20) (1.44) (-0.16) (1.10)
Analystst -0.031 0.198 0.342 -0.050 0.196 0.347
(-0.27) (1.79)* (2.49)** (-0.42) (1.76)* (2.52)**
Instt 0.509 0.621 0.440 0.529 0.636 0.439
(4.27)*** (4.59)*** (3.27)*** (4.41)*** (4.74)*** (3.28)***
Retvolt -0.409 -0.075 -0.415 -0.052
(-3.44)*** (-0.69) (-3.27)*** (-0.45)
Evolt -0.414 -0.702 -0.433 -0.693
(-3.07)*** (-4.80)*** (-3.16)*** (-4.80)***
Turnt -0.391 -0.703 -0.404 -0.709
(-3.43)*** (-5.99)*** (-3.56)*** (-6.01)***
Surpriset 7.613 7.606
(17.70)*** (17.75)***
n 290,774 290,774 290,774 290,774 290,774 290,774
n (quarters) 104 104 104 104 104 104
Average adj. R2 0.012 0.014 0.087 0.011 0.014 0.087
Notes: Panel A presents average coe cient estimates obtained from quarterly cross-sectional regressions
of earnings announcement returns on forecast dispersion and control variables. Average coe cients are
multiplied by 100 for presentation purposes. All independent variables are transformed into quarterly decile
ranks, scaled between -0.5 and 0.5. See Appendix A for details on the variable definitions. t-statistics are
based on time series averages and standard errors adjusted for autocorrelation using Newey and West [1987]
and five lags. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively.
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Table 7
Relation between forecast dispersion and meeting earnings expectations
Panel A: Forecast dispersion and firms’ ex-post propensity to meet or beat earnings expectations
Average Average







Sizet 0.393 0.083 0.370 0.078
(7.62)*** (7.38)***




t 0.855 0.182 0.860 0.182
(9.78)*** (9.82)***
Levt -0.448 -0.095 -0.415 -0.088
(-13.24)*** (-12.14)***
Aget -0.291 -0.061 -0.275 -0.058
(-4.44)*** (-4.02)***
Analystst 0.224 0.047 0.228 0.048
(2.89)*** (3.34)***
Instt 0.246 0.052 0.274 0.057
(7.62)*** (8.52)***
Retvolt -0.167 -0.036 -0.200 -0.042
(-3.12)*** (-3.70)***
Evolt 0.092 0.019 0.076 0.016
(2.58)** (2.51)**
Turnt 0.035 0.007 0.019 0.004
(0.83) (0.43)
n 290,774 290,774
n (quarters) 104 104
Average Pseudo R2 0.067 0.069






Guidet ⇥ Postt 0.074 -0.082
(17.94)*** (-4.81)***
Firm fixed e↵ects Included Included
Year-quarter fixed e↵ects Included Included
n 314,646 314,646
n (firm-quarters) 157,323 157,323
Adj. R2 0.122 0.354
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Notes: Panel A presents average coe cient estimates obtained from quarterly logit regressions of indicator
variable Meett on forecast dispersion and control variables. All independent variables are transformed into
quarterly decile ranks, scaled between -0.5 and 0.5. Marginal e↵ects are computed based on the average of
the quarterly estimates and capture the di↵erence in the conditional probability that Meett = 1 between
firms in the highest and lowest decile of the independent variable of interest, while holding all other variables
constant at their means for the quarter. Panel B presents di↵erence-in-di↵erence OLS regressions of the
within-quarter e↵ect of public earnings guidance on the probability that firms meet or beat the consensus
forecast and forecast dispersion, respectively. For each firm-quarter in our sample, we create two data
points and define the dependent variables based on the consensus forecast measured either 120 days or 1
day before the earnings announcement. Postt is an indicator variable set equal to 0 when the dependent
variable is measured 120 days before the earnings announcement (i.e., pre-guidance), and set equal to 1
when the dependent variable is measured 1 day before the earnings announcement (i.e., post-guidance). We
restrict these tests to firms that provide public earnings guidance at least once in the sample. See Appendix
A for details on the variable definitions. In Panels A and B, t-statistics are based on time series averages
and standard errors adjusted for autocorrelation using Newey and West [1987] and five lags. *, **, and ***
represent statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively.
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